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Currency Crisis and Stock Market Integration: 





Using cointegration and variance decomposition analyses, this paper investigates the 
impact of the 1997 Asian currency crisis on stock market integration in East Asia, and 
compares this experience with Europe’s experience after the ERM crisis. This paper finds that 
in the long and short run, East Asian stock markets became increasingly integrated with the US 
market after the currency crisis, confirming a popular view that the Asian crisis brought about 
US dominance over Asian stock markets. Long and short run relations between Asian and US 
markets on one hand, and between Asian markets themselves on the other hand emerged in the 
post-crisis period. This phenomenon, however, is limited only to Asian stock markets. In Europe, 
the currency crisis ended up eliminating the pre-existing long and short relation, even though it 
led to a temporary increase in stock market linkages during the currency crisis period. In 
particular, the integration of European markets with the US market turned out to be insufficient 
all throughout currency crisis. These contrasting behaviors of Asian and European stock 
markets after the currency crisis seem to result from their different experiences regarding 





It is said that the currency crisis in East Asia brought about an increase in the cross-
market correlations among East Asian stocks. This result is not inconsistent with the findings 
of many studies that examined the impact of shocks like the 1987 US stock market crash or 
the currency crises on the cross-market correlation (For instance, Furstenberg and Jeon 
(1989), Bertero and Mayer (1990), King et al. (1994) and Meric and Meric (1997)). But the 
problem is that the increase in cross market correlations does not necessarily mean an 
increase in the financial market integration, because it can be a transitory phenomenon that 
could be observed only in periods of high turbulence. In fact, Forbes and Rigobon (1998) 
indicates that this is the case. They define contagion as a significant increase in market co-
movement after a shock to one country. According to them, the traditional tests of correlation 
coefficient are biased because the unadjusted cross-market correlation coefficient is 
conditional on market volatility. Correcting for this bias, they find there was virtually no 
evidence of contagion during the 1997 East Asian crisis.  
This means that looking at cross market correlations is not sufficient for investigating the 
question of stock market integration. Indeed, an increasing proportion of empirical studies on 
stock market linkages are now employing cointegration techniques and examining the 
number of common stochastic trends. (For instance, Kasa (1992), Chung and Liu (1994), and 
Masih & Masih (1999) on Pacific Rim county stock markets, Jochum, Kirchgassmer and 
Platek (1999) for Eastern European stock markets) Moreover, it seems necessary to divide 
the periods following the crisis into two sub-periods: crisis period, when the market is 
volatile, and post crisis period, when the market is stable.  
This paper intends to investigate the impact of the 1997 Asian currency crisis on the 
stock market integration in East Asia and to compare this experience with the European 
experience after the ERM crisis. For this purpose, this paper conducts cointegration and 
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variance decomposition analyses for each of the three periods (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis periods).   
We find that in the long and short run, East Asian stock markets became increasingly 
integrated with US market after the currency crisis, confirming a popular intuitive view that 
the Asian crisis brought about US dominance over Asian stock markets. Long and short run 
relations between Asian and US markets on one hand and between Asian markets themselves 
on the other hand emerged. It is important, however, to note that this result is so far limited 
only to Asian stock markets, because contrary to the Asian case, no such result has been 
observed in the case of Europe. It turns out that in Europe, the currency crisis ended up 
eliminating the pre-existing long and short relation, even though it caused a temporary 
increase in stock market linkages during the currency crisis period. Jochum, Kirchgassmer 
and Platek (1999) provide a similar evidence in the case of Eastern European countries. 
According to them, currency crises contribute to eliminating the long run relations that 
existed in these markets. 
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 contains a brief overview of 
the data and the correlations that exist among Asian stock markets on the one hand and 
European stock markets on the other hand. Section 3 focuses on Asian stock markets and 
discusses the empirical findings on the basis of cointegration and variance decomposition 
outcomes. Section 4 conducts the same analysis as in Section 3 for European stocks. Finally, 
a conclusion appears in Section 5. 
 
 
 2. FIRST LOOK AT THE ASIAN AND EUROPEAN STOCK MARKET INTEGRATION 
 
It has been noted that the 1997 Asian currency crisis has helped to increase the stock 
market linkages between East Asian countries and the US, and between East Asian countries 
themselves. Before we investigate the extent of stock market linkages among 10 countries 
(Nine East Asian countries and the US) before and after the currency crisis, we first present a 
correlation table for Asian and US stock markets both in terms of its level (log price) and its 
difference (return). The data for Asian stock markets are daily national stock price indexes 
from 4 January 1995 to 30 June 2000. These indexes include the Nikkei 225 (Japan), KOSPI 
(Korea), Hang Seng (Hong Kong), JCI (Indonesia), KLCI (Malaysia), PCOMP (Phillippines), 
STI (Singapore), TWSE (Taiwan), SET (Thailand) and Dow Jones Index (US), and come from 
Morgan Stanley data base and each national stock exchange. Three periods have been 
distinguished. The reason for this division is because the volatility of the stock market can 
increase during the currency period and thus increased stock market volatility can cause an 
increase in cross market correlations, as Forbes and Rigobon (1998) pointed out. The first 
period was the pre-crisis period ranging from January 4, 1995 to May 30, 1997. Financial 
tensions were already very high in June, 1997, even though the collapse of Thai baht started 
in July. During 1998, the financial turmoil continued with the financial instability in Russia 
adding new elements of uncertainty in the region. It seems that the effects of all these 
turmoils were not eliminated until March 1999. Consequently the crisis period was assumed 
to last from June 1, 1997 to February 26, 1999. Thereafter the post crisis followed. 
Subtracting the days when the stock market was not opened in any one of these 10 countries, 
we can then obtain 460, 338 and 319 observations for each of these sub-periods, respectively.  
Also to compare the stock market integration in East Asia with the European integration, 
we present daily national stock prices for nine European countries and the US: FAZ General 
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(Germany), CAC40 (France), FTSE100 (UK), Madrid SE General (Spain), BEL20 
(Belgium), Amsterdam AEX(EOE) (Netherlands), HEX General (Finland), Copenhagen 
KFX (Denmark), Athens SE General (Greece) and Dow Jones Index (US). Europe was hit 
by the currency crisis during 1992-93. As with East Asia, three sub-periods are distinguished. 
The first period ranges from January 2, 1990 to August 31, 1992, the second from September 
1, 1992 to May 31, 1994, and the third period from June 1, 1994 to December 27, 1995. In 
fact, the first speculative attack came on September 6, 1992 and the continued turmoil forced 
EMS countries to adopt wide bands exchange rate system on July 1993. However, because 
small turbulences subsisted, we assume the crisis period lasted until the end of May 1994. 
The data is based on daily national stock price indexes.  
 





Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
 
Asia US Asia US Asia US Asia US Asia US Asia US 
JAP 0.28 0.50 0.78 -0.49 0.55 0.45 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.18 0.35 0.07 
KOR -0.44 -0.83 0.78 -0.31 0.58 0.69 0.02 0.04 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.05 
TWN 0.09 0.55 0.67 -0.38 0.43 0.34 0.11 -0.02 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.07 
MAL 0.38 0.83 0.87 -0.35 0.50 0.44 0.34 0.09 0.31 0.19 0.26 0.02 
SING 0.36 0.69 0.84 -0.34 0.63 0.73 0.37 0.18 0.42 0.29 0.40 0.02 
PHIL 0.37 0.69 0.81 -0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.28 0.10 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.04 
HK 0.33 0.98 0.84 -0.37 0.48 0.45 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.36 0.04 
INDO 0.38 0.94 0.81 -0.24 0.60 0.67 0.30 0.11 0.27 0.03 0.24 0.02 
THAI -0.34 -0.79 0.85 -0.33 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.03 0.34 0.26 0.35 0.05 
Note: Asian country’s correlation with Asia is calculated as the average value of correlation  
     coefficients for other 8 Asian countries.  
 
   The correlation table for Asian and US stocks reveals two important facts. First, starting 
with (log) prices, we find that Asian stock prices became more closely linked to each other 
during the currency crisis. Compared to the pre-crisis period, the correlation coefficients 
become higher during the crisis period, but they fall again in the post-crisis period. In 
contrast, the correlation coefficients of Asian stock prices with the US price turn out less 
close and negative during the crisis period. This implies that Asian markets, even though 
they were more integrated among themselves, became detached from the US market during 
the crisis period. Secondly, in terms of stock market returns (log price difference), we neither 
confirm a significant increase in correlation coefficients of returns among Asian countries 
during the crisis period, nor during the post-crisis period. Thus, the behavior of Asian stocks 
seems to remain unchanged between pre and post crisis periods. 
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Table 2. Correlation Table for European and US Stocks 
 
           Level 
 
Return 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
 
EUR US EUR US EUR US EUR US EUR US EUR US 
LSP 0.57 0.06 0.95 0.97 0.62 0.25 0.49 0.30 0.33 0.17 0.42 0.28 
LGER 0.56 0.05 0.94 0.93 0.62 0.30 0.48 0.27 0.33 0.10 0.37 0.11 
LFR 0.54 0.48 0.92 0.94 0.16 -0.35 0.52 0.35 0.39 0.24 0.39 0.30 
LUK 0.22 0.83 0.90 0.91 0.52 0.95 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.26 0.42 0.38 
LFIN 0.29 -0.63 0.93 0.94 0.48 0.42 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.27 0.12 
LNET 0.40 0.79 0.95 0.96 0.57 0.91 0.53 0.38 0.40 0.21 0.48 0.32 
LDK 0.45 -0.18 0.95 0.96 0.59 0.43 0.42 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.10 
LBEL 0.57 0.18 0.95 0.94 0.67 0.55 0.50 0.30 0.35 0.16 0.43 0.27 
LGR -0.02 -0.09 0.89 0.91 0.59 0.68 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 
Note: European country’s correlation with Europe is calculated as the average value of         
     correlation coefficients for other 8 European countries.  
 
European stocks show a similar pattern to Asian stocks except for their behaviors during 
the currency crisis period. First, the correlation coefficients of European stocks in terms of 
price level turn out increasing unanimous during the currency period, but end up declining 
during the post-crisis period. Note, however, that during the crisis period, European stock 
prices move together with US stock price. Secondly, the European stocks in terms of return 
correlation show that there is no noticeable change in the extent of stock market integration 
between pre and post crisis periods. However, different behaviors are observed between 
European and Asian stocks again during the currency period. In fact, we find that there is a 
slight decrease in the correlation coefficients of stock returns not only among European 
markets themselves, but also between European and US markets during the crisis period.  
In conclusion, the comparison of correlation tables shows that there are some temporary 
differences in market integration between Asian and European stocks only during the crisis 
period.1 However, there is no evidence at all about different stock market behaviors in Asia 
and Europe after the currency crisis. A more detailed analysis will reveal that this is not the 
case. Indeed, we will show that the integration of Asian markets among themselves and with 
the US substantially increased after the currency crisis period, relying on co-integration and 








                                                        
1 Because, as we will show, stock price series are unstable with I(1), it can be meaningless even to 
speak about the correlation coefficients in price indexes.  
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3. LONG RUN RELATION AND SHORT RUN DYNAMICS OF 




We will first examine the long run relation between Asian stock markets and, for that 
purpose, proceed to the cointegration analysis. The first step is of course to establish 
whether the time series concerned are stationary or not. It is now very well known that only 
the stock returns are stable with stock price series being unstable I(1). Appendix confirms 
that this really is the case, based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test with 
different lag structures.  
Because all stock price series are I(1), we can now conduct the Johansen cointegration 
test. We first test for bivariate cointegration between each pair of markets. Underlying the 
cointegration regression is a VAR with a lag of 3. We choose lag 3 on the basis of Akaike 
and SCB criteria and keep the lag length the same over all models because these information 
criteria have a very limited degree of variation in the optimal lag length. Table 3 provides the 
results of this test procedure. Next, we find that market linkages have increased significantly 
in the post-crisis period. Note first that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is generally 
accepted before and during the crisis period. Only 4 cointegations are found among 45 
bilateral relations during the pre-crisis period, and only 2 cointegrations during the crisis 
period. Thus, there is no significant difference in the behavior of stock market between pre-
crisis and crisis periods. This result suggests that, even though market volatility might 
increase during the crisis period, no long run equilibrium relation emerged and only the short 
run dynamics dominated the behavior of the Asian markets. In the post-crisis period, 
however, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for 21 out of 45 bilateral 
relations. Thus, a long run relation emerged in the post-crisis periods. In fact, if we look 
more closely at which pair of countries maintain the largest number of cointegration 
relations, the US turns out to have the largest number of cointegration relations (8 out of 9 
relations). This means that practically all East Asian stock markets maintain long run relation 
with the US except Phillipines. After the US, Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia 
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Table 3. Bivariate Cointegration Tests for Asian and US Stocks 
 
Pre-crisis period 
 KOR HK TWN INDO SING MAL PHIL THAI US 
JAP 6.03 5.23 7.06 3.5 6.57 6.61 6.51 4.59 5.34 
KOR  10.34 15.12 8.14 8.21 10.92 8.89 9.41 8.07 
HK   10.67  16.83* 8.19 7.67 9.34 9.25 24.06** 
TWN    9.52 10.34 13.49 8.58 12.53 9.95 
INDO     10.49 6.59 4.83 9.2  16.03* 
SING      10.33 14.05 10.34 7.35 
MAL        17.03* 7.59 8.53 
PHIL        6.65 8.56 
THAI         6.62 
 
Crisis period 
 KOR TWN MAL SING PHIL HK INDO THAI US 
JAP 7.57 14.6 7.97 5.85 9.4 7.79 14.61 6.87 8.28 
KOR  5.22 15.84* 22.46** 11.56 9.49 9 8.76 7.53 
TWN   8.37 5.28 6.96 4.99 9.11 6.07 9.18 
MAL    10.23 11.7 12.67 10.63 14.08 9.58 
SING     7.25 8.09 6.97 9.29 8.75 
PHIL      6.57 13.39 11.02 9.94 
HK       8.51 10.84 8.3 
INDO        7.65 7.2 
THAI         12.45 
 
Post-crisis period 
 KOR TWN MAL SING PHIL HK INDO THAI US 
JAP 18.97* 14.68 14.59 16.01* 10.71 12.81 15.47* 11.08 19.46* 
KOR  17.13* 17.26* 22.02** 12.1 14.05 20.47** 13.7 25.00** 
TWN   20.77** 16.30* 8.91 16.11* 14.22 10.53 19.05** 
MAL    20.45** 11.41 21.49** 14.94 13.51 22.58** 
SING     11.31 12.92 17.31* 12.46 25.14** 
PHIL      12.22 9.49 9.39 13.71 
HK       11.68 11.24 20.13** 
INDO        10.35 23.16** 
THAI         16.42* 
Note: *(**) denotes rejection the hypothesis of no cointegration at 5%(1%) significance level.  
     The critical values for 5 and 1% significance level are respectively 15.41 and 20.04.       
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Next, we test for multivariate cointegration for all three periods. Table 4 suggests that 
there is at most a single cointegrating vector or analogously nine independent common 
stochastic trends within 10 variable system regardless of the period concerned.2 Thus, in 
contrast to bivariate cointegration analysis, multivariate cointegration method seems to 
suggest that the Asian crisis did not affect the stock market behavior significantly.  
 
Table 4. Multivariate Cointegration Test for Asian and US Stocks 
 
Hypothesis Critical Value Likelihood Ratio 
No. of CE(s) 5 Percent 1 Percent Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
      None  233.13 247.18   233.954*   248.139**  255.105** 
   At most 1 192.89 205.95 180.280 185.951 178.945 
   At most 2 156 168.36 128.186 139.014 125.999 
   At most 3 124.24 133.57 92.315 95.132 89.943 
   At most 4 94.15 103.18 65.305 69.106 61.214 
   At most 5 68.52 76.07 44.286 44.302 36.654 
   At most 6 47.21 54.46 28.230 24.110 22.932 
   At most 7 29.68 35.65 15.385 10.551 13.637 
   At most 8 15.41 20.04 6.008 4.262 5.493 
   At most 9 3.76 6.65 2.197 0.540 1.534 
Note: *(**) denotes rejection of hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 
 
3.2. Variance Decomposition. 
 
Because Table 4 suggests that there is at most one cointegration relation, we now 
conduct variance decomposition analysis on the basis of the vector error correction method 
(VECM) and examine the short run dynamic property of Asian and US stock markets.3 
Table 5 shows the variance decompositions from one standard deviation shocks to each 
market over a 5 day time horizon. Since the results of the variance decomposition are not 
independent of the ordering chosen for the variables, we follow the trading times of the stock 





                                                        
2 Masih and Masih(1997) find similar results for 6 OECD stock markets. 
3 Indeed the VECM is estimated using a lag structure of 3 for all (log) stock price differences. 
4 Changes in the ordering of stock markets do not change the main conclusions of this section. 
Especially putting US market (previous day) on first place leaves the conclusion intact. 
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Table 5. Variance Decomposition for Asian and US Stocks (5-Day Time Horizon) 
 
Pre-crisis period 
 JAP KOR TWN MAL SING PHIL HK INDO THAI US 
JAP 88.42 1.18 1.25 0.09 0.08 0.84 1.98 0.20 0.32 5.64 
KOR 0.52 97.34 1.08 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.57 0.01 0.07 
TWN 0.30 2.55 94.09 0.12 1.50 0.31 0.54 0.09 0.01 0.50 
MAL 4.54 0.02 1.37 88.69 0.53 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.22 4.32 
SING 8.64 0.20 1.07 28.87 56.18 0.18 0.20 1.34 0.42 2.91 
PHIL 1.51 0.26 1.03 25.05 6.10 60.71 1.14 0.49 0.77 2.95 
HK 2.97 0.75 0.45 23.08 8.52 0.19 59.71 0.30 0.05 3.97 
INDO 3.00 0.06 0.86 24.24 10.19 6.99 0.19 51.40 0.63 2.44 
THAI 1.48 0.11 0.47 12.56 7.99 1.12 2.25 0.21 72.11 1.69 
US 6.20 0.34 0.25 0.48 3.89 0.12 0.13 0.97 0.70 86.93 
 
Crisis period 
 JAP KOR TWN MAL SING PHIL HK INDO THAI US 
JAP 92.16 0.42 0.25 0.05 0.38 1.45 0.51 0.56 0.61 3.62 
KOR 2.70 93.34 0.35 0.02 0.63 0.03 0.91 0.05 1.60 0.37 
TWN 1.32 1.24 90.74 1.44 0.08 0.88 0.29 0.14 0.04 3.83 
MAL 6.28 8.66 2.27 71.33 0.01 3.99 0.47 3.90 2.83 0.25 
SING 2.98 4.52 8.04 16.88 56.45 3.11 1.34 1.97 1.02 3.69 
PHIL 2.01 4.16 4.76 11.64 17.61 48.61 0.72 5.85 0.81 3.83 
HK 1.60 6.94 3.13 8.71 16.26 3.51 53.48 1.20 0.03 5.14 
INDO 4.07 8.46 1.08 0.69 1.98 3.02 2.70 71.58 3.86 2.56 
THAI 4.19 13.78 7.00 6.02 9.95 0.41 1.68 6.34 48.81 1.83 
US 1.32 2.10 1.08 1.37 4.47 3.71 0.04 0.93 1.65 83.34 
 
Post-crisis period 
 JAP KOR TWN MAL SING PHIL HK INDO THAI US 
JAP 70.58 0.20 0.43 3.57 0.44 0.54 3.07 0.86 1.54 18.75 
KOR 5.71 72.87 0.01 2.33 2.39 0.80 0.48 0.38 0.42 14.61 
TWN 7.95 0.16 82.00 1.68 0.08 0.21 0.86 0.85 0.14 6.07 
MAL 3.97 0.46 5.10 69.95 1.98 0.03 0.34 1.23 2.12 14.82 
SING 3.51 5.62 0.21 0.86 65.04 0.46 0.88 0.10 0.25 23.07 
PHIL 1.54 3.84 0.96 2.15 4.44 71.86 0.12 0.27 0.35 14.46 
HK 6.45 6.32 0.44 0.26 16.93 4.06 48.97 1.14 0.78 14.65 
INDO 3.82 1.58 0.12 2.72 14.04 1.83 0.84 70.05 1.61 3.40 
THAI 4.02 3.44 0.76 0.67 9.57 6.55 6.30 1.86 53.24 13.58 
US 0.27 0.22 0.34 1.12 0.21 3.75 0.03 0.52 0.74 92.80 
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Table 5 allows us to gauge to what extent shocks to one Asian market are explained by 
other markets of the system. Looking at the pre-crisis period, we find that in each market, 
most of the variations are explained by its own shocks, and that neighboring countries 
account for only a very slight proportion of variation. This trend does not change much 
during the crisis period. It turns out, however, that variation of Asian markets is to a very 
remarkable degree affected by neighboring countries and the US during the post-crisis period. 
Especially, the role of the US in explaining the stock market variance of Asian stocks is 
pronounced during the post-crisis period. For instance, in the post-crisis period, the US stock 
markets turns out to explain very often more than 10% of the variance of most of regional 
stocks in a 5 day horizon, whereas in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, the US explains 
normally less than 5% of the variance. This means that even in the short run, the US came to 
exercise a dominating role in the post-crisis era.  
Given the increasing dominance of the US stock market in the short run dynamics of 
Asian stocks, we now ask about the causal chain between Asian and US stocks in each of 
three periods concerned. In general, the Granger test is used for this purpose. But in our case, 
the standard Granger test cannot be applied due to the existence of lagged error correction 
term (ECT). Indeed, in a VECM, lagged error correction term representing long term 
equilibrium enters into the estimation equation, together with differenced variables, which 
reflect short run relationships. Thus, through error correction term, the VECM opens up an 
additional channel for Granger-causality. Masih and Masih (1999) test the Granger-
causality in such a vector error correction model. Employing the same technique as Masih 
and Masih, we test for each of the 9 Asian stocks econometric exogeneity of US stock 
(expressed in log price difference or in stock return) and statistical significance of lagged 
error correction term. 
 
Table 6. Temporal Causality between Asian and US Stocks 
                                                                                                       
 Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period 
  Lagged DUS Lagged  ECT Lagged DUS Lagged ECT Lagged DUS Lagged ECT 
DJAP  5.809** 22.134**  7.393**  3.518 13.683** 13.984** 
DKOR      0.398         1.113         1.007         1.454      10.563**          2.204       
DTWN      0.028       4.061*      6.403**       8.043**       4.559**          0.701    
DMAL      5.944**       0.593       1.546        12.767**         5.402**        29.829**     
DSING      11.132**          1.035      12.330**        11.381** 17.089** 14.651** 
DPHIL  2.366  6.176*  6.748**  0.328 10.428** 11.020** 
DHK  1.875  2.488  5.003**  0.549 15.162**  0.038 
DIND  8.393**  3.435  5.865** 19.487**  3.796*  0.003 
DTHAI  2.017  4.822*  3.719*  0.320  4.512** 11.826** 
Note: Figures in the above table are F statistics testing the null hypothesis that lagged US or lagged     
     ECT are statistically insignificant. *(**) denotes rejection of these hypotheses at 5%(1%)  
     significance level 
 
Table 6 suggests that the extent that the US stock market Granger causes the movement 
of East Asian stock markets is reinforced after the currency crisis. Before the crisis, US stock 
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market returns Granger-causes 4 out of the 9 Asian stock markets. Lagged US stock return 
turns out significant in explaining the stock returns in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia. However, after the crisis, it turns out that the US market is exogenous for all 9 
Asian markets. In addition, Table 6 shows that US stock market is affecting Asian stock 
markets through the long run relationship represented by the lagged error correction term in 
some Asian markets.  
 
 
4. COMPARISON OF EAST ASIAN AND EUROPEAN STOCK MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
 
To have a clearer understanding of East Asian stock market integration, we finally 
compare East Asia’s example with Europe’s experience. Europe had a currency attack during 
1992-93, as Asia did during 1997. Because all European stock price series are I(1) as with 
Asian stock prices, we can proceed to the same co-integration test and variance 




First of all, Table 7 presents the bivariate cointegration results for each pair of European 
and US markets.  
 
Table 7. Bivariate Cointegration Tests for European and US Stocks 
Pre-crisis period 
 GER FR UK FIN NET DK BEL GR US 
SPAIN 9.49 5.12 4.17 9.08 3.48 12.37 9.79 14.34 3.86 
GER  10.67 7.77 5.47 5.41 3.95 22.35** 18.02* 4.45 
FR   6.85 4.64 6.64 3.91 19.66* 15.83* 4.19 
UK    8.34 10.85 3.16 9.37 11.39 5.35 
FIN     4.56 6.73 6.67 13.41 8.00 
NET      2.94 7.07 9.61 9.06 
DK       5.82 9.91 6.13 
BEL        18.10* 8.63 
GR         8.74 
 
Crisis period 
 GER FR UK FIN NET DK BEL GR US 
SPAIN 8.26 12.96 17.24* 20.48** 10.83 29.98** 12.08 10.48 25.76** 
GER  12.76 16.16* 13.11 18.38* 11.15 15.17 7.92 12.62 
FR   20.34** 16.68* 20.54** 23.11** 11.05 19.39* 16.65* 
UK    19.80* 20.53** 25.41** 12.49 22.38** 21.54** 
FIN     10.32 17.14* 14.20 12.39 16.54* 
NET      12.16 15.44* 13.05 14.82 
DK       12.43 12.76 26.75** 
BEL        13.64 12.81 
GR         13.39 
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Post-crisis period 
 GER FR UK FIN NET DK BEL GR US 
SPAIN 25.56** 14.38 11.44 8.36 9.36 16.29* 19.06* 13.24 11.57 
GER  23.94** 10.67 11.50 10.54 15.99* 19.59* 16.89* 9.15 
FR   9.84 17.81* 19.17* 10.50 9.29 16.15* 9.99 
UK    3.36 12.56 6.76 11.59 13.55 10.52 
FIN     3.95 5.36 3.96 12.29 4.84 
NET      5.72 8.79 12.96 6.55 
DK       11.33 11.88 7.15 
BEL        14.86 8.72 
GR         9.64 
Note: *(**) denotes rejection the hypothesis of no cointegration at 5%(1%) significance level.  
     The critical values for 5 and 1% significance level are respectively 15.41 and 20.04.       
 
Contrary to the Asian case, the number of bivariate cointegration relations did increase 
substantially during the crisis period. For instance, France and UK saw their stock market 
integration with their neighbors highly increase during the crisis period. Consequently, the 
number of cointegrated bilateral relations increased from 5 during the pre-crisis period up to 
21 during the crisis period. Thus, ERM crisis contributed to creating some long run 
relationship between European countries during the crisis period. This effect is, however, 
transitory, because the number of cointegrated bilateral relations fell back to 10 during the 
post-crisis period. Consequently there seem no apparent changes in the degree of stock 
market integration in Europe between pre and post-crisis periods.  
If we now look at the multivariate cointegration test, there is a slight increase in the 
number of cointegrated vectors during the crisis period, similar to the bivariate cointegration 
test. This suggests that temporarily there might be an increase in the degree of integration 
among European and US stocks.  
 
Table 8. Multivariate Cointegration Test for European and US Stocks 
 
Hypothesis Critical Values Likelihood Ratio 
No. of CE(s) 5 Percent 1 Percent Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
      None  233.13 247.18 270.948** 267.212**  243.057* 
   At most 1 192.89 205.95  202.204*  208.865**  174.276 
   At most 2 156 168.36  147.368  158.394*  132.621 
   At most 3 124.24 133.57  104.837  122.459  94.658 
   At most 4 94.15 103.18  76.095  88.657  63.106 
   At most 5      68.52       76.07     49.911    59.946     41.110 
   At most 6      47.21       54.46     31.274    34.356     26.321 
   At most 7      29.68       35.65     15.929    20.410     14.276 
   At most 8      15.41       20.04      6.328     8.020      4.273 
   At most 9       3.76        6.65      1.447     3.307      0.068 
Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
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4.2. Variance Decomposition 
 
Table 9 provides variation decomposition results.5 We find that different from the Asian 
case, European markets were to a substantial degree affected by their neighboring countries 
before the ERM crisis and the role of the US in explaining the shocks in European stock 
markets remained limited throughout all periods. This suggests that there is no short term 
change in stock market behaviors following the currency crisis.   
 
Table 9. Variance Decomposition for European and US Stocks (5-Day Time Horizon) 
 
Pre-crisis period 
 SPAIN GER FR UK FIN NET DK BEL GR US 
SPAIN 89.66 0.31 3.25 0.13 0.35 0.09 0.02 0.35 0.04 5.80 
GER 29.50 57.96 5.46 0.36 0.09 0.03 0.88 0.04 0.39 5.30 
FR 23.37 6.24 64.01 0.65 0.10 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.02 5.22 
UK 14.06 1.24 14.58 58.86 0.63 1.72 0.22 0.24 0.23 8.20 
FIN 6.29 1.13 4.03 1.24 84.78 0.12 0.72 0.01 0.34 1.34 
NET 23.63 8.40 24.48 2.33 0.20 29.21 0.14 0.05 0.16 11.39 
DK 17.95 5.15 9.16 3.30 0.24 1.12 59.12 0.13 0.71 3.12 
BEL 25.07 6.00 17.84 0.12 2.06 3.40 2.62 37.21 0.29 5.39 
GR 8.99 0.87 1.04 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.79 0.66 84.44 2.80 
US 10.66 0.62 8.80 2.63 0.61 0.81 1.54 0.12 0.35 73.86 
 
Crisis period 
 SPAIN GER FR UK FIN NET DK BEL GR US 
SPAIN 91.27 0.54 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.07 0.04 0.53 6.54 
GER 24.06 59.52 7.96 0.33 2.02 1.00 0.03 0.53 0.75 3.80 
FR 25.57 3.43 60.89 0.24 0.08 0.40 2.86 1.59 1.25 3.69 
UK 17.05 0.85 9.83 68.76 0.07 0.08 0.83 0.26 0.12 2.15 
FIN 6.16 0.52 2.26 0.86 87.50 0.05 0.97 0.03 0.26 1.37 
NET 24.51 7.37 10.60 6.80 0.62 42.50 0.89 0.74 0.85 5.12 
DK 15.36 1.48 2.67 3.18 2.60 0.54 72.59 0.61 0.09 0.88 
BEL 19.71 6.83 7.46 2.70 0.30 2.72 1.15 55.86 0.66 2.61 
GR 0.24 0.22 2.75 0.66 0.17 0.29 0.95 0.06 93.91 0.75 





                                                        
5 The VECM is estimated with the help of Table 8. 
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Post-crisis period 
 SPAIN GER FR UK FIN NET DK BEL GR US 
SPAIN 93.08 0.82 1.54 0.20 0.98 0.03 0.69 0.32 0.55 1.79 
GER 25.72 57.22 5.69 1.26 1.51 0.94 0.07 0.03 0.43 7.13 
FR 28.73 3.56 63.59 0.04 0.07 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.51 2.64 
UK 22.66 9.25 10.34 51.00 0.27 0.10 0.07 0.46 0.10 5.74 
FIN 7.71 5.42 1.56 1.17 78.75 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.46 4.41 
NET 34.77 12.89 7.24 7.24 2.23 28.90 0.33 0.32 0.29 5.78 
DK 16.73 7.36 3.27 1.78 2.90 2.89 62.22 0.02 0.42 2.41 
BEL 22.27 9.61 13.35 5.60 2.74 5.13 0.28 37.33 0.24 3.45 
GR 0.07 2.87 0.26 0.19 1.72 0.71 0.13 0.38 93.44 0.23 
US 8.16 0.18 3.74 5.85 0.60 0.91 0.56 0.25 0.03 79.71 
 
If we look at the causal relationship between European and US markets, then it should be 
noted that even before the crisis, European stock markets are well linked with the US market, 
but not dominated by the US stock market. Most of lagged US stock returns are as significant 
in the pre-crisis period as in the post-crisis period. However, lagged error correction term 
representing the long term behavior turns out insignificant in explaining the short term 
movement of European stocks during the post-crisis period, which reflects the disappearance 
of long term bilateral cointegration relations between European and US stocks in the post-
crisis period.  
 
Table 10. Temporal Causality Between European and US Stocks 
                                                                                                       
 Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period 
  Lagged DUS Lagged ECTs Lagged DUS Lagged ECTs Lagged DUS Lagged ECTs 
DSPAIN 14.59** 5.23** 1.89 6.33** 8.27** 17.88** 
DGER 14.02** 5.18** 12.70** 2.23 33.97** 0.79 
DFR 12.78** 3.71* 2.88* 6.49** 7.83** 0.53 
DUK 18.37** 11.01** 2.49 6.82** 13.52** 0.12 
DFIN 1.67 7.91** 6.26** 1.78 11.59** 1.12 
DNET 17.63** 14.96** 7.41** 3.55* 20.69** 7.31 
DDK 8.92** 1.04 2.55 2.98* 14.61** 0.13 
DBEL 10.07** 15.31** 3.70* 3.51* 15.57** 5.39* 
DGR 2.12 3.73* 1.16 0.07 0.11 31.36** 
Note: Figures in the above table are F statistics testing the null hypothesis that lagged US or lagged       
     ECT are statistically insignificant. *(**) denotes rejection of these hypotheses at 5%(1%)  
     significance level 
 
It seems that the impact of ERM crisis on the stock market integration in Europe is 
limited. Some long run relationships appeared during the crisis period but soon disappeared.  
Why, in the case of Asia, was there a close linkage with US stocks after the currency 
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crisis whereas, in the case of Europe, this relationship was absent? One of the possible 
explanations may be found with capital liberalization, particularly foreign equity investment 
liberalization. In the case of Europe, due to the completion of the Single Market program, all 
countries had already completely liberalized capital flows before ERM crisis took place in 
1993. The crisis worked only as a disruptive factor for already well integrated European 
markets. However, in many of Asian countries, the control on foreign equity investments was 
loosened, especially after the breakout of the currency crisis in 1997. For instance, in Japan, 
the prior notice requirement for portfolio investments by foreigners was abolished in March 
31, 1998. In Indonesia, from September 4, 1997, foreign investors were allowed to purchase 
without limit stocks of non-bank financial firms in the Indonesian capital market. In Korea, 
the easing of capital market control was most apparent because the limit on foreign 
ownership of Korean equities was completely abolished during the currency crisis period. In 
fact, when the currency crisis took place in 1997, the Korean government, having no choice 
but to accept the IMF program, suddenly expanded the equity investment ceiling up to 55% 
and completely eliminated it in May 1998. As a consequence, the share of Korean shares 
owned by foreign investors sharply increased and stock market prices were dominated by 
foreign investors. It should be noted that the liberalization of foreign equity investment can 
lead to the strengthening of Asian stock market integration with US market, simultaneously 
increasing and decreasing the demand for Asian stocks.  
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the impacts of currency crises on the patterns of linkages among 
national stock markets, and for this purpose, compares the behavior of Asian stock market 
after the 1997 Asian currency crisis with the behavior of European stock markets after the 
1992-93 ERM crisis. This paper methodologically distinguishes the periods after currency 
crisis between crisis and post-crisis periods and conducts a cointegration analysis for long 
term relations between stock markets, using level variables (log stock price index), and a 
VECM for short term stock market behaviors, using difference variables (stock returns). 
This analysis tends to indicate that the currency crises in Asia and Europe had a 
contrasting effect on Asian and European markets. In the case of Asia, a market integration 
emerges after the elapse of a currency crisis, whereas in the case of Europe, there appears to 
be a temporary increase in stock market linkage only during the crisis period. Moreover, it 
turns out that the integration of Asian markets with US market increases significantly after 
the Asian currency crisis both in the long and short run, whereas the relation of European 
markets with US market remains very limited throughout the ERM crisis.  
These contrasting behaviors of Asian and European stock markets after a crisis seem to 
result from their different experiences regarding capital liberalization, particularly foreign 
equity investment liberalization. In the case of Europe, due to the completion of the Single 
Market program, all countries were able to completely liberalize capital flows before the 
onset of ERM crisis. The crisis worked only as a disruptive factor for already quite well 
integrated European markets. However, in many Asian countries, the control on foreign 
equity investments was loosened, especially after the breakout of the currency crisis in 1997. 
This explains the emergence of the long and short run close relation between Asian and US 
markets after the currency crisis.  
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  Prices   Returns  
 ADF(3) ADF(5) ADF(10) ADF(3) ADF(5) ADF(10) 
04/1/1995-30/6/2000 
JAP -1.96 -2.02 -2.05 -18.10* -13.54* -9.25* 
KOR -1.45 -1.41 -1.43 -17.79* -14.19* -9.86* 
TWN -1.46 -1.37 -1.54 -16.87* -13.75* -9.79* 
MAL -1.29 -1.25 -1.26 -17.21* -14.61* -9.58* 
SING -1.36 -1.32 -1.30 -17.94* -15.03* -9.93* 
PHIL -1.11 -1.09 -1.21 -16.65* -13.58* -9.23* 
HK -1.88 -1.89 -2.12 -16.90* -14.35* -9.40* 
INDO -2.07 -2.06 -2.31 -16.90* -14.36* -9.19* 
THAI -1.08 -1.05 -0.98 -16.60* -13.37* -9.11* 
US -2.05 -2.05 -2.11 -17.83* -14.82* -10.15* 
02/1/1990-30/12/1995 
SPAIN -1.62 -1.61 -1.65 -18.48* -15.62* -11.08* 
GER -1.72 -1.80 -1.66 -18.71* -16.54* -11.93* 
FR -2.61 -2.63 -2.54 -19.00* -16.27* -11.80* 
UK -0.43 -0.49 -0.52 -18.24* -15.81* -11.71* 
FIN -0.72 -0.84 -0.95 -16.46* -14.32* -9.60* 
NET 0.31 0.20 -0.01 -18.85* -15.61* -10.82* 
DK -1.83 -1.86 -1.87 -19.31* -16.50* -11.29* 
BEL -1.07 -1.19 -1.30 -17.84* -14.65* -10.27* 
GR -3.21 -3.08 -3.27 -17.91* -14.70* -9.68* 
US 0.37 0.35 0.44 -20.31* -17.03* -12.51* 
Note: * means that the hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at 1% significance level, 1%    
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